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Abstract 
Rule-following is affected by multiple variables. A relevant aspect of rules regards whether 
they "make sense", that is, the extent to which the instruction coheres with previously 
reinforced patterns of relational responding. The present study aimed to evaluate the 
influence of relational coherence upon rule-following. After mastering a particular set of 
conditional relations (e.g., A1B1, A2B2), the participants were exposed to two speakers, one 
of which would “state” relations that cohered (e.g., A1B1, A2B2) with the participant’s 
previous relational training and the other that would present relations that were incoherent 
(e.g., A1B2, A2B1). Then, rule-following was measured in a preference test in which the 
participant would have to choose which of the two speakers would provide instructions in 
each test trial. Results show that the participants preferred the coherent speaker to provide 
instructions and followed the rules presented by that speaker throughout the test. Coherence 
is discussed as a critical aspect of rule following and preference for particular narratives. 
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In the last number of years, a programme of research (summaries of which can be found in 
Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Kissi, 2020, and Harte & Barnes-Holmes, 2021) 
has sought to bridge the gap between two disparate areas of research within the behavior-
analytic literature: rule-governed behavior and derived stimulus relations. Rule-governed 
behavior was first described by B.F. Skinner (1966) in the context of problem solving. Rules 
were defined as contingency specifying stimuli that allowed a listener to solve problems 
without having to directly contact contingencies in the environment. A wealth of research in 
the decades that followed sought to explore the impact of rules (or instructions) on human 
performances on schedules of reinforcement. One key finding that emerged from this work 
was that instructed behavior often led to varying degrees of ‘insensitivity’ to the scheduled 
contingencies, at least for verbally-able humans (e.g., Hayes et al., 1986; Shimoff et al., 
1981). That is, verbal humans would often produce patterns of responding that did not reflect 
changes in the scheduled reinforcement contingencies. For example, when instructed how to 
earn reinforcers on a schedule of reinforcement, human participants tended to adapt less 
readily to un-cued changes in contingencies than participants who were not initially 
instructed (see Hayes, 1989, for an early book-length review).   
The second area of research, derived stimulus relations, first emerged with the work 
of Murray Sidman and colleagues (e.g., Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Tailby, 1982), the basic 
phenomenon of which came to be known as stimulus equivalence (see Sidman, 1994 for a 
book length treatment). The key finding was that after training a small number of matching 
responses (e.g., A choose B; and A choose C), unreinforced or untrained matching responses 
often emerged spontaneously (e.g., B choose C; and C choose B). When such novel matching 
responses emerged, the three stimuli (A, B, & C) were said to be participating in a derived 
equivalence relation. Furthermore, other untrained responses also often emerged when a 
particular function was trained to a stimulus participating in this equivalence relation. For 
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example, if stimuli A, B and C participated in an equivalence relation, and stimulus A was 
paired with an aversive stimulus (e.g., presentation of mild electric shock), then stimulus C 
may also acquire aversive functions, all in the absence of direct reinforcement. This latter 
effect has often been referred to as a derived transfer of stimulus functions. While derived 
relational responding, including transfer of functions, appears to occur with relative ease in 
verbally-able humans, it has not been readily observed in nonhuman animals (e.g. Sidman et 
al., 1982; Dugdale and Lowe, 2000).  
 A link between the research on rule-governed behavior and derived equivalence 
relations was made initially when it was argued that rules may control behavior because the 
words contained within the rule participate in equivalence relations. Thus, the instruction or 
rule “When the light turns green, then go” controls appropriate behavior because the word 
“green” is in an equivalence relation with the actual color green. As a result, rules or 
instructions may come to control behavior in the absence of direct reinforcement because 
equivalence relations themselves do not require direct reinforcement for all of the defining 
relations. In fact, Sidman (1994) suggested that when we say that rules “specify” or “refer” to 
contingencies, these terms (i.e., specify and refer) simply indicate that the events “specified” 
in the rule participate in equivalence relations with the words in the rule.  
Despite considerable conceptual overlap between the study of rule-governed behavior 
and derived stimulus relations (e.g., Hayes, 1989; Hayes et al., 2001; Sidman, 1994), research 
has only recently sought to integrate these areas empirically (see Harte, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Kissi, 2020 for a recent review). The basic approach has involved 
providing participants with a rule that contains some level of novel, within-experiment 
derivation and exploring the extent to which participants persist with rule-following in the 
face of reversed reinforcement contingencies. For example, in a number of studies (e.g., 
Harte et al., 2018; Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McEnteggart, Gys et al., 2020), 
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participants were first trained that the phrase ‘least similar’ was equivalent to a nonsense 
symbol ‘XXX’, before being trained that ‘XXX’ was equivalent to a nonsense word ‘Beda’. 
Thus, the equivalence relation between the phrase ‘least similar’ and the nonsense word 
‘Beda’ would emerge. ‘Beda’ was then inserted into a rule for responding on a subsequent 
matching-to-sample (MTS) task (e.g., to earn points “choose the image that is ‘beda’ to the 
sample image”). Each MTS trial involved presenting participants with a sample shape at the 
top of the screen with three comparison shapes along the bottom of the screen. Each 
comparison shape varied to degree in terms of their similarity to the sample shape. That is, 
one shape was clearly very similar to the sample shape, one shape was quite similar to the 
sample but with more variations, and one shape was clearly completely different to the 
sample with little or no overlapping features. Within the MTS task, responding in accordance 
with the partially derived rule was first reinforced but subsequently punished following a 
contingency reversal. Specifically, for the first 100 MTS trials, participants received one 
point per trial upon choosing the ‘beda’ (i.e., least similar) comparison, and lost one point for 
choosing either of the other two comparisons. Participants were required to get a minimum of 
eight out of the first 10 trials correct, and a minimum of 80 out of the first 100 trials correct to 
ensure that they were responding in accordance with the derived rule rather than simply 
learning how to respond in accordance with the task contingencies independent of the rule. 
On the 101st trial, the MTS task contingencies reversed for a further 50 trials, uncued to 
participants, such that points were now awarded for choosing the most similar comparison, 
and lost for choosing either of the other two options. Points visibly accrued on screen to 
participants throughout the task. The main focus of this research was to determine the extent 
to which participants would persist in following a rule (choosing the comparison that was 
least like the sample) when it contained a relation that had been previously derived in the 
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experiment. The critical test involved determining the level of persistence in rule-following 
when the contingencies changed and the rule, therefore, ceased to specify the contingencies. 
In a number of recent studies that have explored the impact of deriving part of a rule 
on persistent rule-following, the role of relational coherence has been manipulated. 
Coherence, in this context, is used to refer to the extent to which a particular pattern of 
derived relational responding overlaps functionally with a specific previously observed 
pattern of such responding1. One approach to exploring the impact of coherence may involve 
providing reinforcement in one condition, versus no reinforcement in another condition, for 
producing a coherent pattern of responding. Two recent studies adopted this strategy (Harte, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McEnteggart, Gys et al., 2020; Harte, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & McEnteggart, 2020). Specifically, the same paradigm described above 
was used to train novel derived relations within the experiment (Least similar = XXX = 
Beda), and then manipulate coherence through the presence versus absence of performance 
feedback for deriving the relations between the nonsense word ‘beda’ and key phrase ‘least 
similar’. Next, the novel relation was inserted into the rule required for responding on a 
subsequent MTS procedure. For the first 100 trials of the MTS procedure, the scheduled 
contingencies supported the derived rule (i.e., participants gained points for responding in 
accordance with the rule). On the 101st trial, however, these contingencies reversed so that 
the scheduled contingencies were now in opposition with the derived rule (i.e., participants 
lost points for responding in accordance with the rule). The general finding was that 
participants showed greater persistence in rule following when the derived part of the rule 
 
1 The reader should note that we are using the term coherence here in a relatively technical way, in that it is 
restricted to the functional overlap (or lack thereof) between patterns of derived relational responding. For 
example, the simple statement, ‘if A is bigger the B, then B is bigger than A’ would typically be seen as lacking 
in coherence with the way in which the verbal community employs the term ‘bigger than’ (i.e., in most contexts, 
the coherent derivation would be that ‘B is smaller than A’). Coherence has sometimes been used in behavior 
analysis in a similar but broader and perhaps less precise way when discussing “sense making” (e.g., Wray et 
al., 2017). In this case, lack of coherence in a derived relational response might be described as “not making 
sense.” Following on from the previous example, a listener might accuse a speaker of not making sense if “B is 
bigger than A” was derived from “A is bigger than B.” 
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had been reinforced with appropriate feedback. Or more informally, participants persisted 
with rule-following to a greater extent when they were informed that they had previously 
derived the “correct” relation between ‘beda’ and ‘least like’. As an aside, this effect was 
moderated by at least one other variable, but that finding is not directly relevant to the current 
research and thus will not be discussed here. 
 While the foregoing studies explored the impact of coherence through providing 
reinforcement versus no reinforcement for producing a coherent pattern of responding, 
another study assessed coherence through providing reinforcement versus punishment for 
coherent responding (Bern et al., 2020). In this sense, coherence was undermined in one 
experimental condition, as opposed to simply involving the absence of reinforcement. 
Additionally, Bern and colleagues sought to explore the impact of undermining a ‘non-
critical’ component of a derived relational network as opposed to a critical component as in 
the studies described above. As with the research described previously, the experiment 
involved first training participants on novel relations within the experiment before inserting 
one of these relations into a rule for responding on a contingency-switching MTS task. 
Specifically, participants were trained on a six member relational network (i.e., 
A=B=C=D=E=F). In one condition, the researchers reinforced the derived F=D relational 
response, making it maximally coherent, while in a second condition the researchers 
introduced an element of incoherence by punishing the derived F=D relational response. 
Critically, this part of the network (i.e., D=E=F) was not necessary for deriving the rule 
required for responding on the MTS task, which was restricted to the A=B=C part of the 
network. Thus, the experiment involved undermining an element of a novel relational 
network that was not necessarily critical for derived rule following.  
Results showed that undermining a non-critical part of the network significantly 
impacted upon persistence in rule-following. Specifically, participants in the condition in 
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which coherence of a non-critical part of the network was undermined persisted with rule-
following for significantly more trials following the contingency reversal than the maximal 
coherence group. Interestingly, this result appears to contradict the earlier finding that 
increased coherence (in the derived rule) produced increased persistence in rule-following. 
On balance, the researchers suggested that the use of punishment in this latter study (rather 
than simply the absence of reinforcement) may have undermined the coherence functions of 
the feedback itself. In other words, when computer-generated feedback was used to 
undermine the coherence of part of a derived relational network, the behavior-controlling 
properties of the feedback were reduced in the MTS task. Consequently, the feedback itself 
was deemed unreliable and participants were more likely to ignore the feedback when the 
contingencies switched in the MTS task (i.e., they persisted with following the rule). 
The studies described above all employed group designs, but the most recent study in 
this line of research has begun to explore coherence and persistent derived rule-following 
using single-case experimental designs (Harte et al., 2021). Specifically, this recent research 
began to explore the impact of flexibility in reversing derived relations on persistent rule-
following; the fact that the study involved reversing previously derived relations also made it 
relevant to the issue of coherence (defined as functional overlap in distinct patterns of 
relational responding). 
In the first of three experiments, researchers first sought to assess flexibility in 
reversing derived relations. Specifically, participants were initially trained on a relational 
network comprising two, three member equivalence relations (i.e., A1=B1=C1 and 
A2=B2=C2), before testing their ability to derive A1=C1 and A2=C2. Next, participants were 
trained and tested in a similar network but that now involved reversing the B and C relations 
(i.e., train A1=B1=C2 and A2=B2=C1; test for A1=C2 and A2=C1). Three participants were 
required to complete these training and testing reversal sequences three times, and in each 
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case they successfully produced test performances in accordance with the most recently 
trained relations, thus demonstrating highly flexible relational responding. 
In a second experiment, 3 additional participants were trained and tested on the same 
derived relational networks as above. In this experiment, however, each training and testing 
sequence was followed by an MTS task in which a rule was presented that employed a 
derived relation that had been trained and tested immediately before the MTS task (i.e., either 
the derived A1=C1 or A1=C2 relation was inserted into the rule for responding). In the first 
instance (i.e., the A1=C1 relation was inserted into the rule), the MTS task contingencies 
cohered with the derived rule. Following training and testing of the reversed network, 
however (i.e., the A1=C2 relation was inserted into the rule), the MTS feedback 
contingencies were now in opposition to the derived rule, and thus responding in accordance 
with the previously trained and tested pattern of relational responding was punished (i.e., 
undermining coherence between the rule and the MTS contingencies). The main aim was to 
assess the impact of flexibility in deriving a relational network on persistent rule-following. 
Results showed that all 3 participants generally responded in accordance with the MTS-
feedback contingencies when the derived rule no longer cohered with the MTS feedback 
(immediately after deriving A1=C2 and A2=C1). More informally, participants readily 
reversed derived relations, but then ignored those relations when they were included in a rule 
that did not cohere with a current MTS task. 
A final experiment partially replicated the foregoing procedure with another 3 
participants, but in this case the MTS task also involved a reversal in task contingencies. 
Specifically, following the training and testing of the relational networks as in the previous 
two experiments, the derived rule and MTS contingencies cohered throughout the first task 
(i.e., when the rule contained the A1=C1 and A2=C2 relations). However, when the derived 
relations reversed (i.e., A1=C2 and A2=C1), the MTS contingencies for the MTS task also 
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reversed and thus cohered with the derived rule; after 15 MTS trials the feedback 
contingencies reversed and thus coherence between the rule and the MTS feedback was 
undermined. In this experiment, all 3 participants produced evidence of persistent rule-
following (i.e., they continued to follow the rule, at least initially after the MTS feedback 
contingencies were reversed). This experiment suggested that increasing coherence between 
the derived rules and the MTS task, by reversing the feedback contingencies for both, the 
behavior-controlling properties of the derived rules increased. Or more informally, 
participants were less likely to “ignore” the rules if they had experienced reversals in deriving 
the relations in those rules and in the MTS feedback contingencies.       
 The studies outlined above suggest that relational coherence within a rule, and 
coherence between a rule and the feedback contingencies for following the rule, may impact 
upon the extent to which participants show persistent rule-following (in the face of reversed 
MTS feedback contingencies). In general, it appears that reducing coherence in some way 
(for the rule, for the feedback, or for the relationship between the rule and the MTS feedback) 
reduced behavioral control (either for the rule or for the MTS feedback). In pursuing the 
potential impact of coherence on rule-following it seems important to explore a range of 
different methods for assessing its impact beyond rule-persistence per se. For example, one 
potential approach could involve exploring the extent to which relational coherence impacts 
upon a choice or preference for following one instruction or rule over another, even when 
both instructions yield the same levels of reinforcement when they are followed. 
In line with this general strategy, the current study sought to explore the extent to 
which manipulating coherence would impact upon the extent to which a listener would 
follow the advice of a speaker and would show a preference for one speaker over another. 
Specifically, after mastering a particular set of conditional relations (e.g., A1B1, A2B2), the 
participants were exposed to two speakers, one of which would “state” relations that cohered 
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(e.g., A1B1, A2B2) with the participant’s previous relational training and the other that 
would present relations that were incoherent (e.g., A1B2, A2B1). Then, rule-following was 
measured in a preference test in which the participant would have to choose which of the two 
speakers would provide instructions for a different task. Although both speakers would 
provide accurate information in how to complete this second task, based on the studies 
described previously, a differential preference may be observed between the two speakers. 
Specifically, participants may prefer a speaker who possesses increased coherence functions 




Four verbally competent adults (Male = 3, Female = 1) ranging in age from 28 to 54 
years (M = 42.50, SD = 12.58) participated. Participants were recruited through personal 
contact with the first author (sample of convenience) and none had previous experience with 
similar psychology experiments. Before the experiment began, participants read and agreed 
to terms of consent (approved by the Brazilian platform for ethical committees, Plataforma 
Brasil, CAAE 19827719.0.0000.5493); at the end of the experimental procedures, they were 
fully debriefed and thanked. Participants did not receive any compensation for participation.  
Equipment and Setting  
The experiment took place in a quiet room with a table, chair, and notebook 
computer. The custom-written software “Preferência Entre Falantes CRF” presented the rule-
following task. Two pictorial representations of “speakers” were presented throughout the 
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phases (see Figure 1). Stimuli from Phases 1-3 were abstract black shapes presented on a 
white background. Stimuli from the preference test were abstract colored shapes. 
Procedure 
Figure 1 presents an outline of the experimental phases divided into 4 stages: (1) 
Relational training, (2) Relational testing, (3) Establishing coherent and incoherent speakers, 
and (4) Preference test. 
Phase 1: Relational training. A respondent-type training procedure (Leader & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2001) aimed to teach four arbitrary relations: A1B1, A2B2, B1C1 and B2C2. 
Before starting, the participants read the following instruction: “This is your first task. Pairs 
of symbols will be displayed on the computer screen. In each trial, a symbol will appear 
followed by a corresponding symbol. You must learn these pairs to answer a test in the next 
stage, so pay close attention (press spacebar to continue)”. 
Each training trial comprised the successive presentation of a given pair of stimuli 
arbitrarily designated to relate to each other (e.g., A1B1). Each trial onset started with the 
presentation of the first stimulus of the pair (e.g., A1) in the center of the screen for 2 s 
followed by a 1 s interval in which no stimulus was presented. Once the interval ended the 
second stimulus of the pair was presented for 2 s followed by a 3 s intertrial interval with no 
stimulus on the screen. Training trials were presented in blocks of four, such that each block 
comprised the random presentation of the four stimulus pairs (A1B1; A2B2; B1C1; B2C2). 
Each block was presented 13 times, thus involving a total of 52 trials. 
Phase 2: Relational testing. Immediately following relational training, participants 
were exposed to a matching-to-sample (MTS) task that sought to test for relational 
responding based on the (respondent-type) relational training phase (e.g., given A1 as a 
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sample stimulus, choose B1 rather than B2 as a comparison stimulus, and so on: A2B2; 
B1C1; B2C2). Before starting, the participants read the following instruction on the computer 
screen: “Now, let's test what you have learned. A symbol will appear at the top of the screen, 
followed by three symbols below. You will have to choose the symbol below that matches 
the symbol above. Choose it by clicking with the mouse cursor. Consider what you learned in 
the previous stage. The computer will record your hits and errors based on the previous stage, 
but will not show this information during the task (press spacebar to continue).” 
Each trial onset presented a sample stimulus on the top of the screen. Following a 1-s 
interval, three comparison stimuli appeared at the bottom, aligned horizontally presented in 
random order across trials (see below). The first stimulus of each pair presented in Phase 1 
were always presented as sample stimuli (e.g., A1). The second stimulus of each pair was 
always presented as one of the comparison stimuli (e.g., B1), with the second stimulus from 
the other pair (e.g., B2), and a third novel stimuli (e.g., N1 or N2). The third comparison 
stimulus was presented to control for rejection responses (see Sidman, 1982; Perez, 
Tomanari, & Vaidya, 2015). Selecting the comparison (e.g., B1) stimulus that was paired 
with the sample (i.e., A1) was considered a correct response, whereas selecting either of the 
two other comparisons was registered as an error. The position of the three stimuli, including 
the correct one, varied based on an analysis of all possible combinations for 3 symbols, in 
such way that for each relation six possibilities were presented in random order, using a 
combination of the Fisher–Yates shuffle algorithm with the subtractive random number 
generator algorithm (Knuth, 2014). No differential feedback was provided for participants’ 
responses. Thus, the comparison selection was followed by removal of all four stimuli from 
the screen, with a 0.5 s intertrial interval, during which the screen remained blank, followed 
by onset of the next trial (i.e., presentation of a sample stimulus). Each pair (A1B1, A2B2, 
B1C1, and B2C2) was presented 12 times in a quasi-random sequence, comprising a 48-trial 
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MTS test block. To proceed to the next phase, participants had to produce a minimum of 80% 
correct responses (i.e., 39 correct test trials). 
Phase 3: Establishing coherent and incoherent speakers. The procedure 
implemented in this phase was similar to Phase 1, except that the stimulus pairings on each 
trial were presented inside a speech balloon next to one of two speakers (see Figure 1). The 
speakers were two characters differentiated by the color of their t-shirts: green or purple. One 
of the speakers presented stimulus pairs that were coherent with the trained and tested 
stimulus relations from Phases 1 and 2 (i.e. A1B1, A2B2, B1C2, and C2B2); the other 
speaker, however, presented pairs that were incoherent with the previously established 
relations (i.e, A1B2, A2B1, B1C2 and B2C1). The t-shirt color assigned for the coherent and 
incoherent speakers alternated between participants. 
Phase 3 started with the presentation of the following instruction on the screen: “Now 
you will meet two characters, one in a green t-shirt and one in a purple t-shirt. They will show 
you pairs of symbols, in a similar way to the first task. Later, you will have to choose one of 
them to help you solve a series of problems, so try to form an opinion about them by looking 
closely at the pairs of symbols they “speak” to you about (press spacebar to continue)”.  
 
Each training trial comprised of the successive presentation of a given stimulus pair. 
Each pair was graphically displayed inside a speech balloon spoken by one of the speakers. 
For one of the speakers the stimulus pairs were always coherent with the trained and tested 
relations from Phases 1 and 2 (e.g., A1B1), but for the other speaker the stimulus pairs did 
not cohere with the previous training and testing (e.g., A1B2). The speaker and the speech 
balloon remained on the screen until the end of the trial. The first stimulus of the pair (e.g., 
A1) was presented in the center of the speech balloon for 2 s followed by a 1 s interval in 
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which the speech balloon was empty; after that, the second stimulus of the pair was displayed 
for 2 s followed by a 0.5 s interval in which the speech balloon was empty. Next, all stimuli 
were withdrawn from the screen during a 2.5 s intertrial interval. No action was required 
from participants to advance to the next trial (i.e. they were expected only to observe the 
screen). Training trials were presented in eight-trial blocks. Each block presented all coherent 
(A1B1, A2B2, B1C1, B2C2) and incoherent pairs (A1B2, A2B1, B1C2, B2C1), once each 
per block in a quasi-random order. Each block started with the coherent speaker and thus the 
presentation of one of the coherent pairs (which of the four coherent pairs presented was 
randomly selected). The remaining seven training trials within that block alternated between 
the coherent and incoherent speaker. A total of seven blocks were presented (i.e., a total of 56 
trials). 
Phase 4: Preference test. This phase started with the presentation of the following 
instructions on the screen: “Ok, you advanced to the next stage! You will be presented with 
two images on the screen. You must choose one of them. Choosing the correct option (there 
is only one!) will give you points accumulated in a counter. In each trial, you must choose 
one of the characters from the previous phase to help you proceed and decide what image you 
should choose. Click on one of the characters to “ask for help”. After that, you must click on 
one of the images, to select it and proceed to the next trial onset. Try to accumulate as many 
points as possible (press spacebar to continue)”. 
Each test trial simultaneously presented the following elements on the screen: in the 
top right-hand side was a counter accumulating points; on the left-hand side the two speakers 
appeared with different t-shirts (i.e., purple and green), placed one above the other (the 
position of the green and purple speakers alternated across trials); on the centre-right of the 
screen, two abstract colored images were displayed side-by-side. These novel colored stimuli 
were selected from a 60-stimulus pool. The position of the correct stimulus was randomly 
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assigned using the subtractive random number generator algorithm (Knuth, 2014) to generate 
an integer number between 0 and 1, and assigning the correct stimulus to the left if the result 
was 0 and to the right if it was 1.  
Clicking on one of the speakers immediately displayed a “hint” (a rule) inside a 
speech balloon located in the center of the screen to the right of that character. No image 
could be chosen before clicking on one of the speakers. If the participant tried to select one of 
the images without first selecting one of the speakers, the following warning message 
appeared: “You must request a hint before choosing an image!” along with an OK button to 
return to the previous screen and proceed with that trial. Once the participant clicked on one 
of the speakers, the rule inside the speech balloon was available until the end of the trial. 
Only one speaker could be selected per trial. Thus, clicking on the second speaker after 
having selected one of them produced no programed consequence. 
During the preference test, the rule stated by both speakers inside the speech balloon 
was always consistent with the programed contingency: “Click on [small version of the 
correct image for that trial] to earn 10 points.” Making the rules/hints produced by both 
speakers consistent with the task contingencies in Phase 4 allowed for an assessment of the 
extent to which a history of “speaking” in a manner that was coherent or incoherent with the 
Phase 1 training, and performance in Phase 2 testing, impacted upon speaker preference. 
After having selected one of the speakers, image selection was enabled. The message “+10 
points” followed correct responses, while "No points earned" followed incorrect responses. 
The feedback message was displayed on-screen for 1 s. Correct responses were always in 
accordance with the rule provided inside the speech balloon. The delivery of consequences 
initiated a 1 s intertrial interval. The preference test comprised a total of 30 trials.  
Results 
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During Phase 2, all participants scored from 43-48 on the MTS test, indicating that the 
respondent-type training presented in Phase 1 had established the predicted relational 
responding. Table 1 presents the results from the preference test (Phase 4). All four 
participants selected the coherent speaker in the first test trial. Three participants (P1, P2 and 
P3) always selected the coherent speaker, and followed the rule provided by that speaker, 
throughout the 30 test trials (i.e., a “speaker coherence preference” index of 1.00). As 
presented on Figure 2, P4 selected the coherent speaker on each of the first 9 trials of the test 
and followed the rule. The incoherent speaker was selected on trials 10 to 16, and on trials 18, 
22, 23, 25, 26, 29, and 30. For each of these trials, except for trial 26, the participant followed 
the rule provided by the speaker (thus obtaining 10 points on each of these trials). On trial 26, 
however, the participant did not follow the speaker’s rule and thus failed to obtain any points 
for that trial (yielding a rule-following idex of .93). 
Discussion 
The current study sought to extend research exploring the impact of relational 
coherence on rule-following by investigating the extent to which manipulating this variable 
would influence whether a listener would follow the advice of a speaker and show a 
preference for one speaker over another. The results showed that all four participants initially 
showed a differential preference for the speaker who provided information coherent with 
previous relational training. In addition, three out of four participants continued to show an 
exclusive preference for that speaker, and followed the rule provided by the speaker, for the 
entirety of the task. Participant 4 demonstrated a more variable performance when compared 
to the other three participants, although responding on the first 9 trials indicated a preference 
for the coherent speaker. Thereafter, the participant alternated their preference response 
across the two speakers and on all but one trial followed the hint/rule provided by the 
speaker. Overall, therefore, the extent to which the rule was coherent (i.e., consistent) with 
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previously established patterns of relational responding appeared to control both speaker 
preference and rule-following (at least initially). 
At the current time it remains unclear why P4 chose the ‘incoherent’ speaker on the 
10th trial. It could have simply been a “genuine” error through lack of attention, etc. or 
alternatively the participant may have chosen to “test” the incoherent speaker. Having done 
so and thus “discovering” that the speaker’s hint/rule cohered with the current task 
contingencies, the participant then alternated back and forth across the two speakers. 
Interestingly, the only trial in which they failed to follow the speaker’s hint/rule was on a trial 
in which they had chosen the incoherent speaker. Although highly tentative, this could 
suggest that the reduced coherence for this speaker established in Phase 3 led the participant 
to “test” the accuracy of this speaker’s hint/rule (but only on one trial). Irrespective of the 
reason why the participant chose the incoherent speaker on the 10th trial, doing so appeared 
to undermine the incoherence functions for this speaker because the participant failed to show 
a strong preference for the coherent speaker thereafter. In other words, having been exposed 
to coherence between the speaker’s hint/rule and the reinforcement contingency for obtaining 
points, the previous incoherence functions for that speaker appeared to be much reduced. 
The present study is, of course, exploratory and was designed largely to develop an 
experimental paradigm for systematically examining the impact of relational coherence on 
subsequent preferences for speakers who produce relational responses that are coherent 
versus incoherent with previously established stimulus relations. In reflecting on the aims of 
the current study and the results found, a number of issues seem worth considering. First, as 
mentioned in the Introduction, developing different methods of assessing coherence beyond 
those employed in the literature currently (e.g., the use of feedback and reversed 
reinforcement contingencies in Harte et al., 2020) seems important. Indeed, pursuing this 
research agenda will be essential in order to explore the potential impact of relational 
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coherence in multiple contexts, and the current study could be seen as successful in this 
regard. Specifically, in the current study, the speakers in Phase 3 provided information that 
was consistent (i.e., coherent) or inconsistent with the relational training and testing from 
Phases 1 and 2, and the impact of coherence/incoherence was then tested in Phase 4.  
In developing the foregoing strategy, it seems important to note that a distinction 
between coherence as an operation versus coherence as a process may be drawn. Specifically, 
relational training and testing followed by exposure to two different “speakers”, one of whom 
produced relational responses that cohered with the prior training/testing and one who did 
not, involved defining coherence as an operation. Coherence as a process, however, was then 
inferred based on the relative preference responses observed in Phase 4. This distinction 
between behavioral operation and process is similar to the distinction that applies to the 
concept of reinforcement; that is establishing a contingency between responding and 
consequences (reinforcement as an operation) and then inferring the process when response 
rate, for example, changes as a result of the operation (Catania, 1984). 
In moving forward with the current research program numerous questions seem to 
emerge. For example, the current study involved presenting stimulus pairings in the same 
sequence across Phases 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., AB and BC relations). A future study could attempt 
to (partially) replicate this procedure but train AB and BC relations in Phase 1 but test for 
derived BA, CB, AC and CA relations in Phase 2 and present these derived relations through 
the speakers in Phase 3. One speaker could produce relations that cohered with Phases 1 and 
2 (e.g., B1A1, C1A1) and the other speaker could produce relations that did not (B1A2, 
C1A2). Would we again observe a preference for the coherent speaker during Phase 4 when 
the training and testing involved tests for derived relations rather than directly trained 
relations?  
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Other studies could explore the extent to which different levels of coherence might 
impact on speaker preference. In the current study coherence was dichotomous, in that one 
speaker always produced a stimulus relation that cohered with the previous training and 
testing whereas the other speaker always produced a stimulus relation that did not. It remains 
to be seen if preference for one speaker over another is sensitive to relative levels of 
coherence in which one speaker produces a high level of coherent relations (e.g., 70%) versus 
the other speaker who produces a low level of coherent relations (e.g., 30%). Indeed, it would 
be interesting to determine if there is some mid-point of indifference (e.g., 51% versus 
49%?).  
A related line of inquiry may also further explore the types of complex relational 
networking that are involved when a participant spontaneously switches from choosing a 
coherent to an incoherent speaker (similar to P4 in the current study). For example, is there a 
difference in subsequent responding when this switch is due to a genuine error on behalf of 
the participant versus a type of ‘testing’ of the speaker’s reliability? Perhaps, research of this 
nature could incorporate a ‘think aloud’ procedure to investigate the “private” relational 
networking occuring during the task. In any case, these types of experimental analyses would 
allow us to more fully explore the concept of relational coherence in the context of derived 
relational responding than has been possible so far. 
One possible limitation to the current experiment that should be addressed in future 
studies occurred in Phase 3. Specifically, in this phase one speaker was established as 
coherent and the other as incoherent by presenting them alongside stimulus pairings that were 
either coherent or incoherent with relational training and testing in Phases 1 and 2. A 
potential order effect could be involved here because the coherent speaker was always 
presented to participants first. It is possible, therefore, that always being exposed to the 
coherent speaker first biased participants in favour of this speaker. Thus we can ask, would 
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the same results have been observed if this feature was counterbalanced across participants? 
If the results differed across participants based on this order effect, it would indicate that 
coherence may be better defined not just in terms of the functional overlap in the stimulus 
relations established across Phases 1 and 2, but also in terms of the order in which the blocks 
are presented in Phase 3. 
In closing it may be useful to consider if only briefly the potential contribution the 
current lab-based research may have in the applied domain. Or more precisely, the current 
research may begin to provide an experimental approach that allows us to explore the 
behavioral variables that increase the probability of one speaker being preferred over another 
in terms of following the instructions they present to relevant listeners (Pennypacker & 
Hench, 1997). In organizations, for instance, leadership could benefit from understanding 
how to create a narrative that engages employees to follow the organizational mission. This 
same rationale could also apply to education, considering that teachers need students to 
follow instructions to perform tasks during and outside classes. In a broader sense, the 
understanding of social dynamics might also benefit eventually from the type of research 
reported in the current article, insofar as studying speaker preference may be considered as 
relevant to phenomena such as persuasion (Biglan, 2016; Galbraith, 1983). One recent 
example is the use of social media platforms to influence “real world” behaviors, ranging 
from shopping to illicit actions (Johnson et al., 2019; Matz et al., 2017). In general, a 
behavioral model clarifying how a particular speaker (or narrative) becomes more prefered 
compared to another could potentially contribute towards mitigating the impact of fake news, 
stigma, and political polarization generally.  
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Table 1 
Results From the Preference Test. 











P1 Coherent 30 30 1,00  0 0 - 
P2 Coherent 30 30 1,00  0 0 - 
P3 Coherent 30 30 1,00  0 0 - 
P4 Coherent 16 16 1,00  14 13 0,93 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
P4 Results From Phase 4.  
 
Note. On each test trial, the speaker selected by this participant (Asked) and the subsequent 
occurrence of instructional control (Followed) are presented in the colored bars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
